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CASE NOTE
CAVEAT EMPTOR, INDEED: EIGHTH CIRCUIT BARS STRICT LIABILITY RECOVERY FROM
SUBSEQUENT PROPERTY OWNERS IN MINNESOTA
Kennedy Building Associates v. Viacom, Inc.
I. INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of caveat emptor has long served to place buyers on notice that deficiencies in the item
being purchased are their own to discover. Presented with an opportunity to lessen this burden for property
owners in Minnesota, the Eighth Circuit chose to decline the invitation in a resounding and unanimous voice.
In Kennedy Building Associates v. Viacom, Inc., the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals limited the breadth
of strict liability. recovery available to subsequent property owners in Minnesota for soil and groundwater
contamination by a prior owner. The court held that the Rylands rule, which governs such strict liability cases.
requires harmful instrumentalities to escape the property upon which they are being held before strict liability
damages will attach. Applying Minnesota law, the Eighth Circuit took the first step in limiting Rylands liability
in Minnesota, a state with a long precedent of expanding the rule. The court's ruling stripped Kennedy Building
Associates, who purchased contaminated property from Viacom's predecessor, of a five million dollar verdict.
leaving them virtually empty-handed for contamination they had no role in creating. Buyer beware, indeed.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Kennedy Building Associates ("Kennedy"), the present owner of environmentally contaminated
property in Minneapolis, brought a state court action in Minnesota against Viacom, Inc. ("Viacom"), the
corporate successor to prior property owner Westinghouse Electric Corporation. 2 Kennedy sought relief under
the Minnesota Environmental Response and Liability Act (MERLA)3 and the Minnesota Environmental Rights
Act (MERA).4 Kennedy also brought claims of negligence, nuisance, and strict liability.' Viacom removed the
action to federal court, at which point Kennedy asserted additional claims for Com rehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA)6 relief and punitive damages. Viacom counterclaimed
under CERCLA, MERLA, and MERA.'
The property, currently owned by Kennedy, was owned by Westinghouse from the 1920s until 1980.,
and was used to house an electrical transformer repair facility.9 Many of the transformers repaired on the site
used an insulation product containing polychlorinated biphenyls ("PCBs"),10 which are now known to be a
highly toxic substance. The PCBs were thinned to the necessary consistency by using chlorobenzenes as a
Kennedy Bldg. Assocs. v. Viacom, Inc., 375 F.3d 731 (8th Cir. 2004).
2 Id. at 735.
Id. at 737; MINN. STAT. § I I5B (2003).
4 Kennedy, 375 F.3d at 737; MINN. STAT. § 116B.
5 Kennedy, 375 F.3d at 737.
6 Id.; 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000).
Kennedy, 375 F.3d at 737.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 735.
0 Id.
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solvent.'' Both MERLA and CERCLA now classify PCBs and chlorobenzenes as hazardous substances; as
such, sites contaminated with the substances are subject to remediation under federal and state law.12
From 1971-73, Westinghouse conducted a study of the sites where it used PCBs to determine whether
the PCBs were leaking off of those sites and onto adjoining property, and, if so, "whether the PCBs were likely
to be detected by others and traced back to Westinghouse." Dr. Thomas Munson, the head of the study, later
testified that, "We found PCBs everywhere we looked."' 4 Munson stated that an initial sampling of four
locations showed clearly that PCBs were leaving the properties.' 5 Though the site in question was not tested,
Munson indicated that "it was a given" that all repair facilities using PCBs were contaminated.' 6
Westinghouse sold the Minneapolis property to Hillcrest Development Company in 1980 without
investigating or decontaminating the property.' Furthermore, Westinghouse failed to make any type of
disclosure as to the nature of its work at the site.'8 Kennedy came into possession of the property in 1982,19
without any knowledge that Westinghouse had disposed of hazardous substances at the site.
21Kennedy prepared to sell the property back to Hillcrest in 1997. Prior to making the purchase,
Hillcrest hired an environmental consultant and discovered that the site was contaminated with PCB.22 After
Hillcrest withdrew its offer, "Kennedy reported the contamination to the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency
(MPCA) and entered the [MPCA's] voluntary clean-up and investigation program."23 Kennedy was required to
investigate the contamination of the soil and groundwater in order to avoid referral to the federal Superfund
program.2 4
In 1999. Kennedy filed suit against Viacom, the successor to Westinghouse, seeking relief under
MERLA. MERA. and under the common law doctrines of nuisance, negligence, and strict liability. 25 Viacom
removed the action to federal court claiming diversity of citizenship and Kennedy added claims for CERCLA
relief and punitive damages.2 Viacom counterclaimed under CERCLA, MERLA, and MERA.27
By the time of trial, Kennedy had expended $106,393.23 investigating the contamination on its
property.2 The Minnesota Pollution Control Agency also ordered Kennedy to file a deed restriction indicating
29that the land was contaminated. Immediately preceding the trial, Viacom and the MPCA entered into an
Id.
















2 Id. In addition, the deed restriction prohibited Kennedy from doing anything to the land that would disturb the soil without first
gaining approval from the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency ("MPCA"). Id.
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administrative consent order.30 Under the terms of the agreement, Viacom would conduct a remedial
investigation, submit a feasibility study. and develop and implement a response action plan.3'
At trial. the district court found that Westinghouse contaminated the property with PCBs and
chlorobenzenes through spillage. overflow of an oil-storage tank. and burning of PCB-contaminated oil.32 The
punitive damages claim and the common law claims of negligence, nuisance, and strict liability were submitted
to the jury." The jury returned a verdict for Viacom on the negligence and nuisance claims, but awarded
Kennedy $225.000 in actual damages and $5.000.000 in punitive damages under the strict liability claim. 34
"[T]he CERCLA. MERLA. and MERA claims invoked the court's equitable jurisdiction," and, as such, were
decided by the court. The court determined that "Kennedy proved its CERCLA and MERLA claims against
Viacom." and that Viacom failed to do so in its claims against Kennedy. 3 6 "The court awarded Kennedy$106.393.23 for . . . costs already incurred and [held] Viacom liable for future response costs."37 In regard to
the MERA claim. the court ruled for Kennedy and required Viacom to "remediate the site's soil, groundwater,
and building interior so that the previously-placed deed restriction may be removed . . . ." Post-trial motions
by Kennedy for prejudgment interest and attorneys' fees were granted., resulting in an award of $41,677.89 in
prejudgment interest for the CERCLA claim and $1.113,915 for attorneys' fees and costs. 39
Followving the judgment. Viacom appealed. 40  The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed thejudgment for strict liability and punitive damages, reversed and remanded the award of injunctive relief, and
remanded the award of attorneys' fees for segregation and removal of the hours spent in furtherance of the
MERA claim. 4 1 The Eighth Circuit also affirmed the prejudgment interest award only as it pertained to the
CERCLA and MERLA claims and reversed the portion corresponding to strict liability damages. 42
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Strict liability law in the United States is as varied as the jurisdictions that recognize it. One theory of
imposing strict liability. holding a party responsible for any damages without regard to negligence or fault,




Id. at 736. Evidence at trial revealed that the site's soil was contaminated with PCB concentrations as high as 9,100 mg/kg and thatgroundwater concentrations were as high as 37.000 mg/iiter. Id. Allowable concentrations are 1.2 mg/kg for soil and .04 mg/liter forgroundwater. Id. Expert witness testimony indicated that approximately 18.000 pounds of PCBs had been spilled at the site, resultingin the contamination of 25.000 tons of soil. Id. Furthermore, testimony was introduced that" because the site was contaminated with






40 Id. at 750.
4 Id.
42 Id.
3 Rylands v. Fletcher. L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
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The facts behind the Rylands case are relatively simple. John Rylands. the owner of a successful steam-
powered textile mill, constructed a reservoir on nearby land to power his mill.44 On December 11. 1860, one of
the walls of Rylands' reservoir collapsed., causing extensive damage to Thomas Fletcher's coal mining
operation. 45 Fletcher initially brought suit at the Liverpool Summer Assizes and then appealed to the Exchequer
Chamber.4 6 Justice Blackburn reversed, and held Rylands liable for the damage. Rylands appealed to the
House of Lords, who affirmed the ruling of the Exchequer Chamber and articulated what has become known as
the Rylands rule:
We think that the rule of law is. that the person who. for his own purposes, brings on his land and
collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes. must keep it in at his peril;
and if he does not do so. is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural
48consequences of its escape.
Two American courts almost immediately adopted the Rylands rule. The Massachusetts Supreme Court
relied on Rylands in Ball v. Nye. 9 and the Supreme Court of Minnesota adopted the rule in Cahill v. Eastman.50
In Ball, the Massachusetts court found the defendant liable when animal manure seeped out of its storage vault
and into the plaintiffs adjoining land, causing damage to his well and cellar.' The court held that the
defendant's inability to control the manure was "of itself negligent.^" Like Rylancs. Cahill involved an escape
of water. 3 The defendants dug a tunnel near the Mississippi River. which was subsequently flooded by the
river, causing extensive damage to the plaintiffs adjoining land. 4 The court held the plaintiffs liable. "without
regard to ... the motives of the aggressor."
Almost as instantaneously as Massachusetts and Minnesota adopted the Rylands rule. other jurisdictions
began rejecting it. New York, 6 New Hampshire.: and New Jersey"8 were among the first to expressly refuse
to apply it. These courts all refused to assign liability without some proof of fault or negligence on the part of
the defendant. In Brown v. Collins. the New Hampshire court concluded that the Rvlands rule was simply
incompatible with the industrial age.?9 The New York courts held that "be[ing] a member of civilized society'
necessarily requires sacrificing some -natural rights" and suggested that taking responsibility for damage one
inadvertently caused is possibly an unavoidable risk.6 o
Jurisdictions in the Eighth Circuit are equally split on the application - and even the exact definition - of
the Rylands rule. Iowa has subscribed to a rather broad application of the rule. noting that an "abnormally
44 Frank C. Woodside Ill et al.. Why Absolute Liability Und/er Rvlands v. Fletcher is A4hsolutelY W rong!. 29 U. D\YOrN L. Rt v. I, 3
(2003) (internal citations omitted).
45 Id. at 3-4 (internal citations omitted).
46 Id. at 4 (internal citations omitted).
47 Id. (internal citations omitted).
4 Id. at 5 (internal citations omitted).
Ball v. Nye, 99 Mass. 582 (1868).
SO Cahill v. Eastman, 18 Minn. 324 (1872). overruledinpuri K Berger Minneapolis Gaslight Co.. 62 NW. 336 (Minn. 1895).
51 Ball. 99 Mass. at 584.
52 Id.
" Cahill, 18 Minn. at 329-30.
54Id.
" Id. at 34344.
56 See Losee v. Buchanan. 51 N.Y. 476 (1873).
See Brown v. Collins. 53 N.H. 442 (1873).
58 See Marshall v. Welwood. 38 N.J.L. 339 (N.J. 1876). overruled by N.J. Dep't. of Enytl. Prot. '. Ventron Corp.. 468 A.2d 150 (N.J.
1983).
5 Brown, 53 N.H. at 450.
60 Losee, 51 N.Y. at 484.
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dangerous" or "ultrahazardous activity" is not required.6' Though South Dakota has declined to either adopt or
reject the rule on numerous occasions, the jurisdiction has taken the position that the rule applies "only to the
thing out of place, the abnormally dangerous condition or activity which is not a 'natural' one where it is." 62
Missouri, on the other hand, appears to have completely rejected the rule.63
Following Minnesota's initial application of the Rylands rule in Cahill, the Minnesota Supreme Court
clarified its definition of the rule in Berger v. Minneapolis Gaslight Company.64 Noting that the Cahill court
extended strict liability for damage caused by anything kept on a 2 erson's property not naturally belonging
there, the Berger court issued an opinion limiting that proposition. Finding the prior rule "too broad," the
holding in Berger limited application of the Rylands rule to incidents in which the things that escaped had the
"natural tendency ... to become a nuisance or to do mischief."66
By the early twentieth century, Minnesota's reliance on the Rylands rule was well settled. 7 Wiltse v.
City of Red Wing articulated the rule as the Minnesota courts routinely applied it: "[A] party who, for his own
profit, keeps on his premises anything not naturally belonging there., the natural tendency of which is to become
a nuisance, and to do mischief if it escapes, is liable if it escapes, without proof of negligence, for all damages
directly resulting there from."68
In a historical context, Minnesota has been unwavering in its requirement that two elements in particular
be met before Rylands will apply: (1) the natural tendency of the instrumentality causing the harm must be to
become a nuisance and cause mischief if it escapes; and (2) the instrumentality must have been in the exclusive
control of the defendant. Nuisance and mischief-causing instrumentalities have included among other things
water 69 and petroleum. 70 Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Minnesota has expressly stated that a review of
past cases imposing the Rylands rule reveals that in each case "the instrumentality causing the harm was under
the exclusive control, as those words are commonly understood, of the party charged."7 In Mahowald v.
Minnesota Gas Company, the Minnesota Supreme Court refused to apply Rylands to a natural gas com any, in
part because it could not be proven that the gas mains were under the exclusive control of the defendant.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In the instant case, Viacom presented a number of different arguments on appeal. Viacom first argued,
and the Eighth Circuit agreed, "that the district court erred in interpreting Minnesota common law to hold a land
owner strictly liable to its successor for contamination of the land."74 Viacom's next contention was that due to
the consent order signed with the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA), the MERA injunction was
moot.75 The court remanded the injunction for clarification, citing the need for a "more precise definition" of
61 Nat'1 Steel Serv. Ctr. v. Gibbons, 693 F.2d 817, 818-19 (8th Cir. 1982).
62 Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Tyler, 482 F.2d 1007, 1009 (8th Cir. 1973).
63 Frank v. Envtl. Sanitation Mgmt, 687 S.W.2d 876, 887 (Mo. 1985) (Welliver, J., dissenting).
6 Berger v. Minneapolis Gaslight Co., 62 N.W. 336 (Minn. 1895).61 Id. at 338.
6 Id.
67 See Wiltse v. City of Red Wing, 109 N.W. 114 (Minn.1906) and Bridgeman-Russell Co. v. City of Duluth, 197 N.W. 971 (Minn.
1924).
6 Wiltse, 109 N.W. at 15.
69 Bridgeman-Russell, 197 N.W. at 972.
70 Berger, 62 N.W. at 336.
7 Mahowald v. Minn. Gas Co., 344 N.W.2d 856, 860 (Minn. 1984) (emphasis in original).
72 Id.
73 Kennedy Bldg. Assocs. v. Viacom, Inc., 375 F.3d 731, 735 (8th Cir. 2004).
74 Id. at 738.
7 Id. at 742.
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the acts required under the consent order. 76 Viacom also argued that the award of attorneys' fees and costs was
inappropriate to the extent that the award contained hours expended in furtherance of the MERA claim, under
which attorneys' fees are not recoverable.7 7 Again the court agreed, remanding the issue for segregation of the
78fees attributable to MERA. Finally, Viacom contended that a settlement offer made prior to trial should have
stopped the accrual of prejudgment interest.79 The court determined that the offer did not meet the statutory
requirements and affirmed the award of prejudgment interest as it pertained to the CERCLA and MERLA
claims.80
A. Strict Liability
In reviewing the strict liability claim for damages, the Eighth Circuit applied Minnesota law.8 1 In strict
liability cases, the English case of Rylands v. Fletcher82 controls. 83 As construed by the Minnesota Supreme
Court, the Rylands rule is as follows: "[A] party who, for his own profit, keeps on his premises anything not
naturally belonging there, the natural tendency of which is to become a nuisance, and to do mischief if it
escapes, is liable if it escapes, without proof of negligence, for all damages directly resulting therein.",8  The
Eighth Circuit noted that though Minnesota has a long history applying the Rylands rule, 8 5 the Minnesota
Supreme Court has yet to entertain the question of whether the rule applies to the case of a landowner suing its
predecessor in title for damage the predecessor caused.
Following a review of Minnesota law and Rylands decisions in other jurisdictions, the Eighth Circuit
87focused its analysis on the "escape" requirement of the Minnesota version of the rule. The court
acknowledged that other jurisdictions do not limit strict liability to cases involving an escape.88 However, the
court held that Minnesota has strictly adhered to its own version of the Rylands rule.89 Under this rule, the
Eighth Circuit declared that an escape is indeed required in Minnesota. 90
Kennedy argued that the act of releasing the PCBs and chlorobenzenes was by definition an escape and
enough to invoke the Rylands rule.91 The Eighth Circuit rejected this contention, relying on a Minnesota
Supreme Court decision92 and characterizing the tort as one in which the "defendant in effect spreads his
dominion past his own property." 93 Because this action was strictly for damage caused to Westinghouse's, and
now Kennedy's. own property and because Minnesota's version of the Rylands rule requires an escape from the
property. the Eighth Circuit held that this case does not fit the pattern of Rylands liability under Minnesota
76 Id. at 748.
7 Id.
78 Id. at 749.
9Id. at 749-50.
so Id. at 750.
Id. at 738.
LR 3 H.L. 330 (1868). Rlands involved a reservoir of water which burst and flooded a series of neighboring coal mines. Id. The
owner of the mines brought suit and successfully recovered damages from the owner of the reservoir. Id.
Kennedy. 375 F.3d at 738-39.
Id. at 739 (quoting Wiltse v. City of Red Wing. 109 N.W. 114, 115 (Minn. 1906) (emphasis in original)).
Id. See Sachs v. Chiat. 162 N.W.2d 243 (Minn. 1968): Bridgeman-Russell Co. v. City of Duluth, 197 N.W. 971 (Minn. 1924); and
Hannem v. Pence. 41 N.W. 657 (Minn. 1889).
86 Kennedj,' 735 F.3d at 739.
8" Id. at 739-42.
88 Id. at 742.89 id.
90 Id.
9' Id. at 741.
92 Id. at 741-42; Hannem v. Pence. 41 N.W. 657. 659 (Minn. 1889).
9 Kennedy, 375 F.3d at 741-42 (quoting Hannem. 41 N.W. at 659).
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law.94 Accordingly. the court reversed the $225,000 strict liability award and the accompanying $5,000,000
award of punitive damages.
B. MERA Injunction
In regard to Viacom's claim that the MERA injunction is moot, the court performed a multi-step
analysis. Viacom argued that because they entered into an administrative consent order with the Minnesota
Pollution Control Agency prior to trial, the order was "entitled to some sort of preemptive effect" over the
9)7MERA injunction. The court. however. held that when a consent order specifies only 9eneral actions that a
defendant must take to clean up a site. preemption of a MERA injunction will not occur. On the other hand,
MERA does not authorize an injunction that conflicts with an existing order from the MPCA. 99 Whether any
conflict will arise between the MERA injunction and the MPCA consent order is "completely speculative" at
this point. due to the fact that Viacom and the MPCA have yet to agree upon the substantive terms of the
remediation.'(1
Viacom further argued that the administrative consent order rendered the MERA claim moot.101 The
court found that the terms of the consent order between Viacom and the MPCA provide Kennedy with no
method of enforcing the decree.' 2 To deprive Kennedy of the MERA claim would leave them with no
enforceable clean-up rights against. Viacom.' 0 3 Noting that if the MERA claim were dismissed and some
*impediment arises'^ in Viacom's performance of the consent decree, Kennedy would be back "at square
one."lo4 the court held that the MERA claim was not moot because the agreement between Viacom and the
MPCA has not ~irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation."10
The Eighth Circuit's analysis. however, was not yet complete. Relying on prior case law, the court
interpreted MERA to authorize injunctive relief to clean up hazardous substances only when the substances
create ongoing pollution of natural resources. 06 Accordingly, the court examined the district court's injunction,
and held that the order exceeded the relief authorized by MERA because it ordered complete clean-up of the site
without any reference to what would be necessary to forestall ongoing pollution in the future. 0 Since the
injunction was inconsistent with the scope of MERA. the issue was remanded for the injunction to be redrawn




97 Id. at 743.
9'Id. at 744.
99 Id.
'* Id. at 744-45.
ion Id. at 745. -Simply stated, a case is moot when the issues presented are no longer 'live' or the parties lack a legally cognizable
interest in the outcome." Id. (quoting Count\ of Los Angeles v. Davis. 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979)).
102 Id.
103 Id.
1(" Id. (internal citations omitted).
'os See id. at 745-46.
' Id. at 747. See Werlein v. United States. 746 F.Supp. 887. 898 (D.Minn. 1990). vacated in part on other grounds by Werlein v.
United States, 793 F.Supp. 898 (D.Minn. 1992).107 Kennedy, 375 F.3d at 747.
' Id. at 747-48.
155
MELPR, Vol. 12, No. 2
C. Attorney s Fees
In the district court, Kennedy was awarded attorneys* fees, expert witness fees and costs pursuant to
authorizing provisions of MERLA. 0 Viacom argued that when the amount of attorneys' fees were determined,
the total number of hours included hours that were spent in furtherance of the MERA claim, under which
attorneys' fees are not allowed.'' 0 The Eighth Circuit held that when a determination of whether to separate
hours for differing claims must be made., two elements should be considered: (1) "whether the claims involve a
common core of facts and were based on related legal theories;" and (2) "whether the plaintiffs level of successjustifies basing the fee award on the hours reasonably expended."'
After considering the relationship between the MERLA and CERCLA claims and comparing them with
the facts surrounding the MERA claim, the court held that the distinction in the "aims and purposes" of the
claims was sufficient to require the district court to separate out the fees extended in furtherance of the MERA
claim. Accordingly, the issue was remanded for a reduction of the fee award.' 13
D. Settlement Offer and Prejudgment Interest
Viacom's final argument was that a settlement offer it proposed before trial should have stopped the
accrual of prejudgment interest pursuant to Minnesota law. ' The district court rejected this contention.
holding that the offer was "not sufficiently precise" to afford it the statutory protection.' The Eighth Circuit
agreed with the ruling and affirmed the judgment as entered.1 6 The court noted that only the interest pertaining
to the strict liability award must be vacated. while the CERCLA and MERLA awards should be affirmed.' '7
V. COMMENT
Ruling that strict liability recovery under the Rylandy rule requires the harmful instrumentality to escape
onto other pieces of property. 118 the Eighth Circuit has expressly limited the scope of the rule. Presented with
an opportunity to expand the reach of strict liability in Minnesota, the court instead held that land owners are
not strictly liable to subsequent purchasers for contaminating the purchased land.' Instead. land owners can
escape Rylands liability by ensuring that any harm-causing instrumentalities in their possession affect only the
land they own. Application of the Eighth Circuit's decision has the possibility of resulting in a seemingly
inconsistent situation. For instance, in a group of landowners with property contaminated fifteen years before
any of the individuals purchased the land. all of them could recover under the Rylands rule except for the
individual upon whose land the contamination originated. In this situation. the current owner of the land. where
109Id. The authorizing MERLA statute is MINN. SrAT. § I 15B.14 (2003).
0 Kennedy, 375 F.3d at 748.
' Id. The court went on to note that "[njo fee can be awarded on unsuccessful claims that were not related to the successful claim.-Id.
Id. at 749.
113Id.
114 Id. at 749-50. The applicable statute is MI\\. STI.\. § 549.09 (2003).
' Kennedy. 375 F.3d at 750.
"6 id.
117 Id.
" Id. at 741-42.
" See id.
156
MELPR, Vol. 12, No. 2
the contamination originated, has no more responsibility for the contamination than any of the other owners.
Nevertheless, the owner is denied the option of using the strict liability doctrine to recover damages.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the district court's state law rulings de novo.120 Because
the Minnesota Supreme Court had yet to consider the question of whether an escape was required for Rylands
liability to attach, the Eighth Circuit's analysis of the issue was one of first impression.' 2 As such, the court is
required to consider "related state court precedents, analogous decisions, considered dicta, and other reliable
sources in an effort to determine what the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision would be." 22 A review of these
persuasive authorities indicates that in a majority of other jurisdictions following the Rylands rule, courts have
held that subsequent owners may not attempt to hold their predecessors in title strictly liable.123 As a result,
these jurisdictions require that the harmful instrumentality must escape the property for recovery to be available.
Minnesota, however, has long remained independent in its application of Rylands. Minnesota was one
of the first American jurisdictions to adopt the Rylands rule and consistently apply it.124 Prior to the instant
decision, Minnesota state courts have chosen to give the rule a broad and expansive interpretation. After
adopting the rule, Minnesota courts expanded Rylands from simply a recovery mechanism for damage caused
by an escape of natural resources to cover pollution, ground water contamination, and even damage caused by
pile driving. 25
Similarly, Minnesota also expanded Rylands by allowing non-neighboring landowners to recover under
the doctrine.126 Initially, only individuals with adjacent property could use Rylands to recover for damage
caused by a dangerous escaping instrumentality.127 The courts later gave the rule a broad reading, however, and
allowed a plaintiff who was walking by a building and was injured by falling ice to recover under Rylands.128
The court also expanded the rule and applied it to an individual who was not the owner of the land when he
created the danger.129
t The instant decision breaks with the precedent of interpreting Rylands broadly and swings decisively in
the other direction. Given the opportunity to define the Rylands escape requirement in broad or narrow terms,
the court unequivocally chose a narrow reading. In so doing, the court deprived a class of potential litigants of a
viable and valuable remedy. Following the Eighth Circuit's holding, an individual who purchases contaminated
land cannot recover in strict liability from the previous owner who created the contamination. Assuming the
contamination spread to adjacent lands, however, the neighboring landowner faces no such bar. The sole
distinction is whether the contaminating materials "escaped" across the boundaries of the property.
The Eighth Circuit opted to view an escape in terms of movement from one piece of property to the
next. Viewed more broadly, an escape also occurs when contaminating pollutants escape the control of one
owner and infringe upon the rights of a subsequent owner of the same property. This broad definition not only
allows a subsequent landowner to recover from his predecessor, but also parallels Minnesota's past
interpretation of Rylands requirements. While no court has expressly adopted this approach in conjunction with
the Rylands rule, forging new legal ground should be no deterrent for the Minnesota courts. As previously
120 Id. at 738 (citing Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231 (1991)).
121 Id. at 739.
122 Id. at 738 (quoting Union Pac. R.R. v. Reilly Indus., 215 F.3d 830, 840 (8th Cir. 2000)).
' Id. at 739.
124 Id. at 738.
125 Id. at 738-39. See Cahill v. Eastman, 18 Minn. 324 (1872); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 457 N.W.2d
175 (Minn. 1990); and Sachs v. Chiat, 162 N.W.2d 243 (Minn. 1968).
126 Id. at 740.
127 id.
128 Id. See Hannem v. Pence, 41 Minn. 657 (1889).
129 Kennedy, 375 F.3d at 740. See Cahill, 18 Minn. 324.
13o Kennedy, 375 F.3d at 741.
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noted, Minnesota was not only one of the first jurisdictions to adopt Rylands, but has been a leader in expanding
the scope and coverage of the rule.' 3'
By allowing an escape to occur within the boundaries of a single property, the Rylands rule will more
effectively serve its ultimate purpose of protecting individuals from property damage inflicted by others.
Although a subsequent owner may bear the burden of discovering contamination on property they purchase,
such procedures are not always feasible, affordable, or even warranted. This burden is more effectively borne
by the owner causing the contamination and by holding property owners strictly liable for the damage they
create, whether on their own property or on the property of others.
VI. CONCLUSION
When the Eighth Circuit limited the Rylands rule to situations in which harmful contaminants cross
property boundaries, it accomplished more than simply depriving Kennedy Building Associates of five million
dollars. The court effectively barred the protections of strict liability from individuals who purchase land
contaminated by prior owners. This narrow reading of the escape requirement caused the court to miss an
opportunity to afford a remedy to a growing class of blameless plaintiffs. Instead, the Eighth Circuit ignored
this opportunity and chose to protect those with whom the fault surely lays.
Defining the escape requirement of the Rylands rule in broad fashion is consistent with Minnesota's past
interpretation of the rule and would continue to protect those individuals who truly deserve the protections of
the law. Affording the benefits of strict liability recovery to subsequent property owners who inadvertently
purchase contaminated land is a step the Minnesota Supreme Court would have chosen to take. Though caveat
emptor still stands and a buyer must almost always beware, the Eighth Circuit missed an opportunity to lessen
the burden in Minnesota and failed to apply the Rylands rule in a manner consistent with Minnesota precedent.
JASON M. SCHERER
1" Id. at 738 (citing Jed Handelsman Shugerman, The Floodgates ofStrict Liability: Bursting Reservoirs and the Adoption ofFletcher
v. Rilands in the Gilded Age, 110 YALE L.J. 333. 348 (2000)).
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